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Heikki Ikäheimo, Sydney
AnimAl ConsCiousness in Hegel’s PHilosoPHy of subjeCtive sPirit
I
What exactly are the subjective features or capacities that distinguish humans from animals on 
Hegel’s account in the Encyclopaedia? Hegel demarcates sharply between animals and humans 
in a quite traditional way by saying that humans, in contrast to animals, are thinking beings. 
Also, according to what I take to be Hegel’s »official account« only humans have consciousness 
(Bewusstsein). My topic in this article is a serious problem that the latter thought involves. Given 
what Hegel means by ›consciousness‹, the idea that animals wholly lack consciousness is incom-
prehensible. For if it were true, distinctively animal life would be impossible.
 In brief, ›consciousness‹ for Hegel stands for what philosophers nowadays call ›intentiona-
lity‹. Whereas sensations (Empfindung) are a way in which the outer world (in the case of the 
»outer sensations«) and the inner states or processes of the organism (in the case of the »inner 
sensations«), appear to the organism without it thereby experiencing the world in terms of objects 
facing it, consciousness is an intentional way of relating to the world that involves a subject-ob-
ject-relation. Consciousness is about objects for a subject. The section ›Phenomenology‹ is the 
place where Hegel discusses various – both theoretical and practical – forms of intentionality, as 
well as the ›I‹ that is the intentional subject. The sub-section that Hegel titles ›Consciousness as 
such‹ (Bewusstsein als solches) discusses different types, modifications or moments of theoretical 
intentionality, whereas the sub-section ›Self-consciousness‹ (Selbstbewusstsein) discusses types, 
modifications or moments of practical intentionality.
 The problem is at its clearest in the case of the first chapter of the sub-section ›Self-conscious-
ness‹ titled ›Desire‹ (Begierde). Being a modification of consciousness in the generic sense, i. e. 
a form of intentionality, desire is something that animals, on Hegel’s official account in the Ency-
clopedia, cannot have. Indeed, Hegel does not use the word ›desire‹ at all in his discussion of the 
animal’s relation to its environment in the main text of the Encyclopedia philosophy of nature. 
But this is puzzling: Isn’t it clear that (at least higher) animals are able to grasp things in their 
environment as desirable objects? How else could an animal ever satisfy its needs in the specifi-
cally animal way – by searching, and in the case of carnivores hunting, suitable entities to devour 
them?
 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in 20 Bänden, Volume 8, Frankfurt/M. 968, –.
 Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 0, 9–7 (§ 99–0); G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie 
des Geistes (87–88), Hamburg 996, 68–87.
 Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 0, 99–0.
 Hegel, Werke (note ), vol. , 7.
 The word only appears in the lecture material, see Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 9, 68, 7, 9 and 9, 
and Hegel, Vorlesungen, (note ), 6 and 6.
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 Note that having things in view as desirable objects and satisfying needs with them is closely 
related to, or requires, another capacity: the capacity for having things in view as objects in space 
and time, or in particular locations in relation to oneself. Again, how else could an animal locate 
an entity, move itself towards it and devour it? This means more trouble for Hegel’s official ac-
count: The organization of the givens of the outer senses into distinct objects with spatio-temporal 
identity is something that Hegel discusses in Psychology, in the first chapter of the sub-section 
›Theoretical spirit’ titled ›Intuition‹ (Anschauung). As a moment of the functions of spirit as the-
oretical, discussed in Psychology, it seems that Hegel means intuition, too, to be an exclusively 
human phenomenon.
 The problem is thus the following: if animals lack the capacity for grasping the world in terms 
of spatiotemporally determinate desirable objects then they seem incapable of animal life. Some-
thing has gone wrong and I believe the reason is that on Hegel’s official account consciousness 
requires thinking, and since animals do not think, they cannot have consciousness either.6 The 
only solution, it seems, is to find a consistent way to attribute to animals the necessary form of 
intentionality that they need to live distinctively animal lives. This requires either accepting that 
there is a form of consciousness that does not require thinking, or accepting that there is a form of 
thinking that animals are capable of.
 What I want to do next is to show that – inbuilt in the Encyclopedia – Hegel in fact already 
has the conceptual means to get his conception of the animal form of life right. That is, the text 
also includes an »unofficial account« that solves the above problem. I argue that the four chapters 
marked with α. of the sections ›Phenomenology‹ and ›Psychology‹ in Philosophy of Subjective 
Spirit, combined with what Hegel actually says about the animal’s relation to its environment 
in Philosophy of Nature, can be seen as outlining a primitive form of intentionality that animals 
need in order to be what they are, one that works in some sense without thinking.7 This primitive 
form of intentionality is something that animals share with uncultivated humans such as young 
infants.8
II
I have argued elsewhere that the sub-sections ›Consciousness as such‹, ›Self-consciousness‹, 
›Theoretical spirit‹ and ›Practical spirit‹ are parallel with each other in that the chapters marked 
with α. of each of these four sub-sections discuss internally interconnected aspects of the finite 
subject’s epistemic and volitional life: ›Sensuous consciousness‹ (B.a.α) and ›Desire‹ (B.b.α.) 
internally interconnected theoretical and practical aspects of intentionality, and ›Intuition‹ (C.a.α.) 
and ›Practical feeling‹ (C.b.α.) internally interconnected theoretical and practical aspects of men-
tal activity necessary for these forms of intentional relatedness to objects. The β.-chapters are 
parallel with each other in the same general way, and so are the γ.-chapters.9 Here our topic is 
only the α.-chapters.
 In each of the α.-chapters mentioned we witness Hegel discussing different aspects of the 
primordial unfolding (Urteil) of the subject-object-relation, or intentionality, out of the non-inten-
6 On the theoretical dimension not perception (Wahrnehmung) (see Hegel, Vorlesungen (note ), ), 
nor even sensuous consciousness (see note ).
7 See, however, the very end of this article.
 According to Hegel, in being born, the child progresses from a »vegetative state« to »an animal way of 
life (Weise des Lebens)« Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 0, 78.
9 See H. Ikäheimo, »On the Role of Intersubjectivity in Hegel’s Encyclopaedic Phenomenology and 
Psychology«, in: Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, 9/0 (00), 7–9.
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tional mode of givenness of the outer world and the bodily processes in sensations. The »I« (Ich) 
discussed in ›Phenomenology‹ stands as an intentional subject against objectivity. It is both (in-
tentionally) receptive of the world in that its outer sensations are synthesized into sensuous con-
sciousness about objects, and transformative of them in that its inner sensations are transformed 
into desire for some of them. Intuition and practical feeling (Praktische Gefühl) discussed in the 
corresponding α.-chapters of Psychology are the mental activities that bring about this synthesis 
or translation of sensations into intentions.
 Let us take a closer look at this by starting from ›Sensuous Consciousness‹. According to He-
gel, the object of sensuous consciousness is determined, for the subject, as »a being and reflected 
in itself, further as an immediately singular«.0 Later in the same chapter Hegel characterizes the 
object of sensuous consciousness as »being, something, existing thing, singular and so on«. The-
se are very abstract characterizations, but we get a preliminary grasp of the structure of the object 
of sensuous consciousness when we compare it with what it is not – that of the object of percepti-
on (Wahrnehmung). In perception the subject experiences the world as consisting of objects with 
distinct properties. But if this is what distinguishes perception from sensuous consciousness, 
how are we then to understand the structure of the object of sensuous consciousness – a singular 
object which is not, for the subject, differentiated in terms of distinct properties? We can figure 
this out by taking a look at the practical dimension of the α.-level.
 An essential element of the inner sensations whereby the organism feels its immediate bodily 
needs is their hedonic value: the agreeable and the disagreeable (das Angenehme und Unange-
nehme). In the chapter ›Practical feeling‹ Hegel thematizes the transformation of the disagree-
able sensations of need or lack into an intentional object-relation. Such disagreeable sensations 
stemming from the tension between the inner determinations of the organism and its actual state – 
centrally between its need for particular kind of nutriment and current malnutrition – are an im-
mediately felt »ought« (Sollen) that »develops«, according to Hegel, »in consciousness«, into 
a »relationship towards outer objects«. This, on my reading, is the coming about of the most 
primitive form of practical intentionality or consciousness: desire. The primitive subject feels a 
bodily need and this gets transformed into desire for objects that would abolish the disagreeable 
sensation by satisfying the need.
 In Erdmann’s notes from Hegel’s 87-88 lectures on Philosophy of Subjective Spirit the 
result of this transformation of felt need into an object-relation is put bluntly: »[t]he lack in me 
appears as an external object«. This accords exactly with what Hegel says about the object of 
desire in chapter ›Desire‹: »Self-consciousness knows […] of itself an sich in [an] object, which 
in this relationship corresponds to the drive.«6 What Hegel is talking about here is a subjective 
viewpoint to the world in which nothing else counts other than features that make objects func-
tional for abolishing the disagreeable sensation of lack or need that the subject has.7 In this sense 
0 Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 0, 0–6.
 On the official view »[f]or the animal there is no something, thing, singular« (Hegel, Vorlesungen (note ), 
).
 Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 0, 08–0.
 Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 0, 00–7.
 Ibid., 90.
 Hegel, Vorlesungen (note ), 6. See also Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 0, 7: »The [subject] intuits in 
the [object] its own lack […]«. On my reading Hegel discusses the same phenomenon at length in § 359 
of philosophy of nature, yet without using the intentional vocabulary of ›desire‹ (Hegel, Werke, (note 
), vol. 9, 68–9.
6 Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 0, 6.
7 See P. Redding, Hegel’s Hermeneutics, Ithaca and London 996, 0–0.
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the subject »knows itself« (an sich, i. e. without realizing this to be the case) in its object, that is, 
has the object in view only from the point of view of, or signified by, the subject’s own organic 
processes.
 But, assuming that we are talking about a primitive subject that cannot think, how does the 
transformation or »development« (Entwicklung) of felt need into desire for objects happen? This 
we can answer by combining the discussions of the α.-chapters of ›Phenomenology‹ and ›Psy-
chology‹ with the discussion of the animal’s relation to its environment in the Philosophy of 
Nature. The answer is: by instinct.8 According to Hegel every animal species relates to a parti-
cular selection of features or objects in the world.9 In his words, each animal has a »non-organic 
nature« determined by the particularities of its needs as a member of a particular species. The 
Zusatz to § 6 explains this further: »each animal has only a restricted sphere for its non-organic 
nature […] which it has to find by instinct. […] [W]hat is present to the animal is this specific 
determination of the grass, moreover of this grass, this corn etc. – and nothing else [emphasis 
H. I.]«.0
 In other words, an animal subject has in view – or to use the term that Hegel avoids in the 
Philosophy of Nature, is conscious of – only what its instinct points out as desirable in its envi-
ronment. The object if »present to« the subject in light of one »specific determination«: a parti-
cular quality (smell, sound, colour etc.) that makes the object instinctively desirable to it. This, I 
claim, is exactly what Hegel is talking about in chapter ›Desire‹ of the Philosophy of Subjective 
Spirit, only in other words. The primitive subject does not subsume the object under a universal 
and thereby have a sense of a plurality of objects sharing a property. Rather, what is present for 
it is always only this singular desirable something. This, I claim, is exactly what Hegel is talking 
about in chapter ›Sensuous consciousness‹, again only with other words. Even if Hegel’s official 
account does not allow it, in fact Hegel is talking about the primitive α.-level of consciousness as 
something that animals are capable of.
 Let us now return to the theoretical dimension of the α.-level of consciousness. The questi-
on posed above can now be answered: »how are we to understand the structure of the object of 
sensuous consciousness, which is a singular object but which is not, for the primitive subject, 
differentiated in terms of distinct properties?« The answer is: it is a singular object that, for the 
subject, has no other determination than the quality that makes it instinctively desirable to it. As 
to its logical structure – in being for the subject identical with one quality – the object is being-
logically (seinslogisch) determined.
 But Hegel has more to say about the synthesis of such being-logical desirable singular some-
things out of the manifold of sensational material. To see this we need to combine the parallel 
discussions of the α.-chapters ›Sensuous Consciousness‹ and ›Intuition‹. I noted above that in 
order for the primitive subject to have in its view a singular object – which we now know is so-
mething identical with its desirable quality – and actively to follow it, it needs to be able to grasp 
it as an object with spatio-temporal identity. This active synthesis that has the deliverances of the 
five senses as its material is what Hegel calls attention (Aufmerksamkeit).
 That attention is central for the spatio-temporal synthesis of objects in ›Intuition‹ is not imme-
diately apparent in the text and Hegel seems to hesitate on the issue. Yet, on a rational reconstruc-
8 Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 9, 7–.
9 Ibid., 7–.
0 Ibid., 7. 
 See P. Redding, The Logic of Affect, Ithaca and London 999, , .
 Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 0, § 8 and § 8 speak against this interpretation. Hegel, Werke, (note 
1), vol. 10, 252 (§ 44 Zusatz) speaks for it: it is »intuition« that makes »the shifting away of sensation 
from us, a transformation of the sensed into an object which is given outside us.« 
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tion it makes good sense to think that synthesizing the sensational material of the different outer 
senses into singular objects with spatio-temporal identity requires focusing attention on and the-
reby grasping order in the cluster of sensations that an objectively spatio-temporally subsistent 
thing produces in the subject. Or, as Hegel puts it, one needs »attention, the abstract identical 
direction of spirit in feelings […] without which nothing has being for it«. As this formulati-
on suggests, anything has being for a subject only as a result of the synthesis of sensations (or 
»feelings«) that attention brings about. That something is for a subject, means that the subject is 
conscious of it.
 Note that all of the activities of spirit as theoretical really are activities (Tätigkeitsweisen) and 
that as such they are interconnected with the subject’s practical or volitional life in general – with 
what motivates and directs the subject. What motivates the object-synthesizing attention of the 
primitive subject is the felt physiological need, and what gives it direction is instinct. It is so-
mething in the sight, sound, or smell of an object that instinctively draws the attention of the 
primitive subject into one »identical direction«, focuses and synthesizes the deliverances of all its 
relevant senses – and so it grasps a desirable object as a singular unit in some specific location in 
space and enduring in time. Now it can satisfy its needs like animals do.
III
Obviously, a cultivated human being is capable of much more than the primitive desiring intenti-
onality of the α.-level. In the β.-chapters of ›Phenomenology‹ and ›Psychology‹ Hegel discusses 
intersubjectively mediated and propositional aspects of intentionality and the corresponding co-
gnitive-volitional mental activities. Assuming that these are exclusively human capacities, it is 
thus first here that an exclusively human form of consciousness is at issue. On Hegel’s holistic 
principles, once more elaborate levels of consciousness are at place, they will mediate the α.-level 
too. Hence the level of primitive object-constitution that in animals and young human infants 
takes place instinctively is in cultivated humans infused with »thinking«.6
 Does the distinction between instinctual and thinking mental activities then provide a clear-cut 
demarcation between humans and animals, or to be more exact, between animals and uncultivated 
humans on the one hand, and cultivated humans on the other? Hardly. All of the more elaborate 
cognitive activities discussed in ›Psychology‹, as well as the corresponding aspects of intenti-
onality discussed in ›Phenomenology‹, take learning and habituation.7 Simply put: cultivation 
(Bildung) is a gradual process. When fully explicated, the demarcation of humans from animals 
 Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 0, § 8 speaks against this interpretation. Hegel, Vorlesungen (note ), 
9–9 speaks for it: »Space and time are the forms of the sensible, forms of intuition. […] They are 
[…] ideal forms that do not belong to determinations of feeling as such. This is the activity of intel-
ligence, attention to self, the act that posits this content outside of itself in order to make itself free. 
[emphasis H.I.]«
 Ibid., 9.
 In contrast, sensations are identical with the subject, not something for it.
6 The same happens to sensations.
7 »The form of habit covers all kinds and levels of the activity of spirit« (Hegel, Werke, (note ), vol. 0, 
16). In the most general sense »thinking« covers not only what Hegel discusses at the end of ›Theo-
retical spirit‹ in chapter ›Thinking‹ (C.a.γ.), but is a general name for all of the cognitive activities dis-
cussed in ›Psychology‹. On the theoretical ones, see C. Halbig, Objektives Denken: Erkenntnistheorie 
und Philosophy of Mind in Hegels System. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 00.
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in terms of thinking will not turn out to be any simpler a matter than the demarcation in terms of 
consciousness.8
Dr. Heikki Ikäheimo
5/20 Tranmere street
2047 Drummoyne
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Australia
heikki.ikaheimo@scmp.mq.edu.au
8 Hegel explicitly acknowledges, on the one hand, that the I comes about in children »in an empirically 
graded way« (Hegel, Vorlesungen (note ), 60), and, on the other hand, that instinct allows for degrees, 
so that it is at its strongest in simple animals and weaker in more developed animals (Hegel, Philosophy 
of Nature, (ed. M.J. Petry), Volume III, London and New York 970, 67). One is reminded of Hegel’s 
notorious remarks about Africans, the gist of which is that both their subjective capacities and their 
objective form of life are somewhere between the animal and the fully human. We may ignore Hegel’s 
empirical views about Africans but take in the philosophical implication: the distinction between the 
animal and the human is not only individually, but also collectively, a matter of degree.
